Get To Know Grant Fowler

Facts

• The appellant (a 14‑year‑old pupil in Year 9) attended Newquay Tretherras School in Cornwall. On 12 July 2001, during his lunch break, after the indoor lunch period he went outside to the school field for recreation.
• Another pupil had placed food on the ground to attract seagulls, with the intention of throwing stones at them. One stone thrown by that pupil accidentally struck the appellant in the eye, causing serious injury.
• On duty were two “dinner ladies” (supervisors), one indoors, one outdoors; but at the time of the accident only one (Josie Brewett) was supervising outdoors. She was supposed to supervise pupils both in years 7‑8 and also glance at years 9‑10, but in practice focused on younger years more and only occasionally at the older pupils including the appellant.
• The number of pupils under her supervision was large: estimates ranged, but the Recorder at first instance found approximately 300 pupils in the relevant year groups on the field.

Procedural History & Issue

• The claimant sued Cornwall County Council (the local education authority) under both the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 and in negligence. The claim was initially dismissed at trial.
• On appeal, only the negligence claim was pursued. The key legal issues included: whether the supervision arrangement was negligent; whether the risk of stone‑throwing was known or ought to have been foreseen; and whether even with better supervision the accident would have been prevented.

Judgment (Court of Appeal)

• The appeal succeeded: the Court of Appeal held that there was negligence in the supervision provided.
• The court held that having just one supervisor outside for such a large number of pupils, especially where a substantial number of older pupils were present, was inadequate. The supervisor’s focus on younger pupils and only occasional attention to older pupils was insufficient to meet the duty of care.
• The purpose of supervision includes both deterring dangerous behaviour and stopping it if it occurs. The court emphasised that a court should not be too ready to accept that “the dangerous activity would have happened anyway” regardless of supervision.
• On the facts, the appellate court found that it was not reasonable to accept that stone‐throwing would have occurred even if there had been proper supervision, especially since pupils stated they would not have thrown stones if a supervisor was nearby.

Legal Importance & Implications

• This case sets a useful precedent about what constitutes adequate supervision in schools under negligence law. It emphasises that supervisors must not merely be present but must be in a position to observe behaviour, intervene, and deter misconduct.
• It clarifies that supervisory ratios and the assignment of duties (who watches which pupils, how many, of what age) are relevant to duty of care.
• The ruling also underscores the role of foreseeability: prior incidents (or knowledge of stone‑throwing) are relevant to what supervision should be in place. Even if no direct previous incidents had been formally recorded, evidence that stone‑throwing was known or possible informs what is reasonable.
• Also important is causation: the court rejected the idea that even with proper supervision the event would necessarily have happened — so negligence was not defeated by the “happened anyway” defence.

Facts

• On 1 September 2002, Mr Drew fell off a ladder while working for Whitbread and sustained injuries, particularly to his lower spine.
• He brought a claim in December 2005, alleging negligence and breach of statutory duty. Damages were claimed for past losses (~£3,677.84) and future losses (≈ £18,325), including a claim that he would need help at home (“care and assistance”). He also claimed an award under Smith v Manchester Corporation for loss of amenities of life.
• Liability was contested. The case went to trial and was treated as a multi‑track case owing to the size and complexity.

Judgment & Key Outcomes

• The trial judge found Whitbread liable but also held that Mr Drew was 25% contributorily negligent.
• On the issue of future care/assistance, medical evidence found that Drew would not need care beyond three months post‑accident, so the claim for long‑term assistance was rejected.
• Damages awarded (after contributory negligence) were £9,291.56. A Smith v Manchester award was made, and some money had already been paid into court under Part 36 offers.

Procedural/Costs Issues

The more interesting aspect of Drew v Whitbread relates to costs assessment:

• Although the case was started and allocated as multi‑track, the defendant argued (in the costs assessment phase) that costs should be assessed as if the case had been allocated to the fast track, because (in their view) many aspects of the case were suitable for fast track treatment.
• The District Judge did indeed assess costs on a fast track basis, despite the trial judge’s order that costs be awarded on the standard basis (which is typical in multi‑track).
• The defendant argued that the claimant had exaggerated parts of his claim, and this should influence the costs awarded.
• On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while a costs judge can take into account the issue of whether a case should have been allocated to fast or multi‑track for the purpose of assessing proportionality and reasonable costs, they cannot override the trial judge’s costs order by assessing “as if” fast track when the trial judge has explicitly ordered costs on the standard basis.
• Also, the appeal clarified that failing to raise track allocation or conduct issues at trial does not automatically preclude their consideration at the costs assessment stage, though raising them earlier is preferable.

Significance

• Drew v Whitbread is often cited in relation to CPR 44 (on costs), especially sections 44.3 and 44.5. It helps clarify how the courts should handle cost proportionality and the interaction between track allocation and cost assessments.
• It also emphasises that the standard basis costs order (if made by the trial judge) must generally be respected, and cannot simply be downgraded to fast track costs unless the judge’s order is varied or set aside properly.
• The case is relevant for lawyers in personal injury (and more broadly tort) work, in managing expectations about recoverable costs when claims are partially successful, when there is contributory negligence, and when claimants seek future care or assistance

Facts

Mrs Broadfield was employed by Meyrick Estate Management as an accounts assistant. On 26 September 2005, she left her office at lunchtime, which was on the first floor of a building accessed via a steep, old cottage staircase. The staircase had a straight flight with a handrail on the right-hand side, then a landing with a turn, then two further steps up to the threshold of her office. The last riser was aligned with the threshold. The stair treads were narrow compared with their rise.

At the threshold (or immediately before it) she missed her footing, tripped, and fell onto the landing; momentum carried her further down the straight flight of stairs. She sustained serious injury to her spine. She claimed that, had there been a continuous handrail including over the two steps up to the threshold, she might have regained her balance and avoided the fall.

Legal Issue(s)

The case turned on:

1. Whether under Regulation 12(5) of the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 there was a statutory duty to provide a suitable and sufficient handrail on at least one side of every staircase used as a traffic route, unless an exception applied.
2. Whether the failure to provide a continuous handrail (including over the top two steps) breached that duty.
3. Causation: whether the lack of handrail was causative — i.e. that the claimant would have used the missing handrail and thereby avoided the injury.

Decision

The Court of Appeal dismissed Mrs Broadfield’s appeal. Key findings:

• The handrail already provided (along the straight stretch) was held to be “suitable and sufficient” under the Regulation, despite not being continuous. The Regulations require a handrail, but what counts as “suitable and sufficient” depends on the facts (type of staircase, usage, risk, nature of users).
• Even if the handrail over the top two steps had been provided, the Court held that causation was lacking: the evidence did not support that the claimant would have used that portion of handrail to arrest the fall. In short, she could not show that the absence of that handrail caused her injury.

Significance

• Statutory duty & Regulations: The case clarifies the meaning of “suitable and sufficient” in Reg 12(5) of the Workplace Regulations 1992. What is “sufficient” is fact‑sensitive; mere non‑continuity doesn’t automatically imply breach if overall safety is reasonably met.
• Exception & burden: The employer bears the burden of proving any exception (e.g. that a handrail could not be provided without obstructing the traffic route). But even if breach is established, strong causation evidence is needed to succeed.
• Causation in negligence/statutory claims: Emphasises that a breach of statutory duty is insufficient for liability if it cannot be shown that the breach caused the injury. Claimants must show some reasonable likelihood they would have taken the protective measure had it been available.

Facts

• The claimant, Mr. Verlander, was a casual worker whose job involved lifting heavy items (specifically scrap freezers and refrigerators) at Devon Waste Management.
• On 30 August 2002, he alleged that while lifting a freezer (~4‑5 feet high) he twisted his back and sustained injury.
• The defendants disputed the mechanism of injury — they challenged whether Mr. Verlander had proved that his back injury resulted from a “substantial lifting movement” as described.

Legal Issue

• The central legal issue was burden of proof: whether the claimant had discharged it by showing on the balance of probabilities the precise mechanism of injury.
• The judgment also considered the principle from Stephens v Cannon about when a tribunal may “resort to the burden of proof” — namely, only in exceptional circumstances when the evidence is conflicting or deficient.

Decision

• The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge (or Recorder) was entitled to find that the claimant had not established his claim. The evidence was considered inconsistent, with challenges to credibility, and critically there was insufficient evidence about the mechanism of injury.
• The Court agreed that resorting to the burden of proof (i.e. dismissing the claim because of lack of proof) was legitimate here, given the quality of evidence and the failure to meet required standard.

Significance

• Verlander is often cited as clarifying how strictly courts treat evidence of mechanism of injury in personal injury claims. Claimants must give persuasive evidence of how the injury happened.
• It reinforces that burden of proof may be shifted (or rather the claim dismissed) if evidence is contradictory or fails to support key issues — but only if the court has considered carefully whether findings of fact are possible.
• Also, the case shows that mere medical evidence of injury is not enough: linking it to what happened at work (causation at the fact/mechanism level) is essential.

Facts

• Mr. Smith was an employee working for S Notaro Ltd.
• He was required to carry and move heavy loads over uneven surfaces at a building site owned by another party.
• No proper training was provided by his employer for handling loads in such challenging conditions.

Legal Issues

• Whether the employer had breached the Manual Handling Operations Regulations 1992, Regulation 4, which requires employers to reduce risk from manual handling operations so far as is reasonably practicable.
• Apportionment of responsibility or liability: whether the owner of the building site (where the hazard existed) bears some responsibility for the unsafe walkway which contributed to the accident.

Decision

• The Court of Appeal held that the employer did breach Regulation 4 by failing to provide training for moving loads across an uneven surface.
• However, the amount of damages or the apportionment was adjusted because the owner of the site was found also responsible for the unsafe walkway. In other words, liability was shared.

Significance

• Smith v S Notaro Ltd is often cited in employer liability cases to illustrate that compliance with health & safety regulations (like the Manual Handling Regulations) demands more than just general safety policies—it requires specific training where risks are foreseeable.
• Also, it underlines that liability can be split when more than one party contributes to the dangerous condition—e.g. the employer and the owner of the premises.